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IS BIOPHARMA READY FOR THE STANDARDS WARS? 
 
 
Jorge L. Contreras1 
 







This symposium contribution sheds new light on Momenta v. Amphastar, a recent federal case 
in which issues relating to standardization and patent disclosure that have previously been 
observed in the semiconductor, computing and telecommunications sectors found their way into a 
dispute between two biosimilar manufacturers. One such manufacturer, Momenta, participated in 
the development of a standard for testing the purity of generic enoxaparin under the auspices of 
the United States Pharmacopeial Convention, but failed to disclose that it had applied for a patent 
on the testing method. When Momenta later sued Amphastar for infringement based on its use of 
that testing method, Amphastar raised defenses of waiver and equitable estoppel, then brought 
antitrust claims against Momenta and its distribution partner Sandoz. Amphastar prevailed at the 
district court on all three theories before the case was settled prior to disposition on appeal. This 
case demonstrates that issues surrounding the acquisition and disclosure of patents on 
standardized technologies have more salience in the biopharma sector than commonly believed. 
As such, standards organizations operating in this sector should ensure that their policies and 
procedures are robust enough to delineate clearly the obligations of participants with respect to 
patents covering standardized technologies, and organizations that participate in biopharma 
standards-development should heed the valuable lessons offered by more than three decades of 
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In 2011, Momenta Pharmaceuticals, the manufacturer of a generic biosimilar version of the 
best-selling anticoagulant drug enoxaparin, sued another generic enoxaparin manufacturer, 
Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, for patent infringement. The asserted patent (U.S. Patent No. 
7,575,886 (the ‘886 Patent)) covered not any chemical structure or attribute of the drug, but a 
quality control method used in its manufacture.  According to Amphastar, it was required by the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to use the allegedly infringing Method 207 for the 
production of generic enoxaparin.2 And because at least one Momenta researcher was involved in 
the development of Method 207 at the United States Pharmacopeial Convention (USP), and 
because Momenta failed to disclose the resulting ‘866 Patent prior to adoption of Method 207 as 
an official USP standard, a federal district court held that Momenta waived its right to enforce the 
patent against Amphastar, was estopped from doing so, and that any such enforcement constituted 
a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
 
Contentions such as these have been made for decades in the computing, networking, 
telecommunications and semiconductor industries (generally lumped together as “information and 
communications technology” or ICT), which depend heavily on industry standards.3  Litigation 
over the disclosure and non-disclosure of patents essential to industry standards (standards-
essential patents or SEPs) has included both private claims and enforcement actions by 
governmental agencies, both in the U.S. and abroad. The aggregate of these disputes has 
colloquially been termed the global “standards wars”.4 But while a range of industry standards 
have been developed for biotechnology and pharmaceutical applications,5 few of them have 
resulted in disputes relating to patents.  Momenta v. Amphastar is notable, if not unique, in that it 
brings to the biopharmaceutical sector a type of dispute most frequently encountered in the ICT 
industry. The Momenta case is also distinctive among biopharma patent disputes in that it involved 
not a branded pharmaceutical manufacturer suing a generic manufacturer for patent infringement 
(a relatively common occurrence) or vice versa, but a patent dispute between two generic 
biosimilar producers.  
 
Part I of this essay provides an overview of the recent law and policy that has evolved around 
the disclosure and non-disclosure of patents within the context of industry standard-setting, 
primarily in the ICT sector.  Part II describes the background and facts of Momenta v. Amphastar, 
then discusses the district court’s holding regarding Momenta’s alleged failure to disclose the ‘866 
patent.  This essay concludes with some observations regarding the implications of this case, and 
 
2 Complaint for Plaintiff at 9, Amphastar Pharm., Inc. et. al. v. Momenta Pharm., Inc., No. 5:15-cv-01914 (C.D. 
Cal. filed Sep 17, 2015).  
3 There are a few notable exceptions, including the FTC’s case against Unocal with respect to a standard for 
gasoline additives. See discussion in Part III.A, infra. 
4 See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras, The Global Standards Wars: Patent and Competition Disputes in North America, 
Europe and Asia, University of Utah College of Law Research Paper No. 353 (Apr. 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3106090. 
5 See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras, Technical Standards and Bioinformatics, in BIOINFORMATICS LAW: LEGAL ISSUES 
FOR COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY IN THE POST-GENOME ERA (Jorge L. Contreras & A. James Cuticchia eds., 2013) 
(describing a range of standards in the fields of genetics, genomics and computational biology). 
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the growing importance of collaboratively developed industry standards, for the biopharmaceutical 
sector more broadly. 
 
 
I. STANDARDS AND PATENTS 
 
A. Policies of Standards Development Organizations 
 
Most of the technical interoperability standards used today were developed by market 
participants collaborating within trade associations known as standards-development 
organizations (SDOs). SDOs range from governmentally recognized bodies that address a diverse 
range of standardization projects (e.g., the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)), 
to large, well-established private sector groups that address the standardization needs of major 
industry segments (e.g., the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF), and Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)) to 
smaller groups often referred to as “consortia” that focus on one or a handful of related standards 
(e.g., the HDMI Forum, Bluetooth Special Interest Group and USB Forum). Because of the 
significant market benefits that arise from the broad adoption of technical standards,6 a high degree 
of cooperation among competitors has long been tolerated by antitrust and competition law 
authorities, which might otherwise discourage such large-scale coordination by competitors.  
 
Many of the technological features included in standards can be patented. Such patents are 
typically obtained by those SDO participants that make technical contributions to the standard.  
However, to the extent that patents cover technologies that are “essential” to the implementation 
of a standard (“standards-essential patents” or “SEPs”), concerns can arise. Specifically, there is a 
risk that the holder of a SEP could emerge after the broad deployment of a standard, and then 
demand excessive rent from all implementers of the standard. Because those implementers may 
have invested significant amounts in the design and production of standardized products, they may 
incur high, if not prohibitive, costs if they are forced to switch to a new, noninfringing (and non-
standardized) technology. As a result, they may be willing to pay an excessive price to the SEP 
holder to avoid having to incur even higher switching costs. This phenomenon has been termed 
patent or standards “hold-up” and is discussed extensively in the literature.7 In addition to harming 
potential competitors, patent hold-up can have other undesirable market effects, including raising 
prices for consumers and hindering technological innovation.8 
 
 
6 See U.S. Dep’t Of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: 
Promoting Innovation And Competition 33-37 (2007) [hereinafter DOJ-FTC Antitrust & IPR]. 
7 See Norman V. Siebrasse, Holdup, Holdout and Royalty Stacking: A Review of the Literature, in PATENT 
REMEDIES AND COMPLEX PRODUCTS: TOWARD A GLOBAL CONSENSUS (C. Bradford Biddle et al. eds., (2019)); Jorge 
L. Contreras, Technical Standards, Standards-Setting Organizations and Intellectual Property: A Survey of the 
Literature (With an Emphasis on Empirical Approaches), in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, VOL. II – ANALYTICAL METHODS 185, 199-200 (Peter S. Menell & David Schwartz 
eds., 2019); DOJ-FTC Antitrust & IPR, supra note 6, at 35–40. 
8 DOJ-FTC Antitrust & IPR, supra note 6, at 35-40; Renata B. Hesse & Frances Marshall, U.S. Antitrust Aspects 
of FRAND Disputes, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST 
AND PATENTS 263, 265 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2018). 
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In order to ensure broad access to the standards that they develop, and to avoid patent hold-up, 
many SDOs have adopted policies that fall into two general categories: disclosure policies and 
licensing policies.9 Disclosure policies require SDO participants to disclose SEPs that they hold to 
the SDO, generally prior to the approval of a standard. Early disclosure of SEPs enables standards 
developers to decide whether or not to approve a design that is covered by these SEPS, to choose 
an alternative, non-infringing technology, to modify a draft standard before it is approved to 
eliminate the infringing feature, or to seek licenses to the patented technology.10 
 
Licensing policies, on the other hand, require SEP holders to grant manufacturers of 
standardized products the right to use their SEPs on terms that are either royalty-free (RF) or that 
bear royalties that are “fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory” (FRAND). These commitments 
are intended to assure product manufacturers that they will be able to obtain all licenses necessary 
to manufacture a standardized product. FRAND or RF licensing commitments are required of all 
SDOs accredited by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and are also utilized widely 
among other SDOs around the world.11 
 
B. Standards Deception as a Defense to Infringement of SEPs  
 
When a SEP holder violates the patent disclosure requirements of an SDO and subsequently 
seeks to enforce patents against implementers of a standard, the infringing implementer may raise 
one or more equitable defenses. These defenses include fraud, estoppel, laches, waiver, unclean 
hands, and implied license.12 Each of these defenses is based on the failure of the SEP holder to 
disclose a SEP necessary for implementation of the collaboratively-developed standard. For 
example, in Stambler v. Diebold, the patent holder (Diebold) was found to have known for ten 
years that a proposed standard concerning the activation of automated teller machines infringed its 
patent, yet remained silent “while an entire industry adopted the proposed standard.”13  The court 
concluded that Diebold’s silence was “intentionally misleading” and granted summary judgment 
for the defendant based on the equitable doctrines of laches and estoppel.  
 
In Wang v. Mitsubishi,14 Wang Laboratories proposed a memory chip standard to an SDO 
known as the Joint Electron Device Engineering Council (“JEDEC”).15 During the three years that 
the standard was deliberated at JEDEC, Wang did not disclose that it was seeking patent protection 
for the chip design. After the standard was approved by JEDEC and manufacturers like Mitsubishi 
 
9 See DOJ-FTC Antitrust & IPR, supra note 6, at 42. These policies are generally considered to be binding on 
participants in the SDO’s activities, though the legal effect of such policies is not always clear. See Jorge L. Contreras, 
A Market Reliance Theory for FRAND Commitments and Other Patent Pledges, 2015(2) UTAH L. REV 479, 501–17 
(2015). 
10 See Gil Ohana & C. Bradford Biddle, The Disclosure of Patents and Licensing Terms in Standards 
Development, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST AND 
PATENTS 244, 245 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2018); DOJ-FTC Antitrust & IPR, supra note 6, at 42–45. 
11 Justus Baron, et al., Making the Rules: The Governance of Standard Development Organizations and their 
Policies on Intellectual Property Rights, JRC SCIENCE FOR POLICY REPORT EUR 29655 (Nikolaus Thumm ed., Mar. 
2019). [hereinafter JRC Report]. 
12 See generally, Daryl Lim, Unilateral Conduct and Standards, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL 
STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST AND PATENTS 47, 56–60 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2018). 
13 Stambler v. Diebold, Inc., No. 85 CV 3014, 1988 WL 95479 at 6 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). 
14 Wang Labs., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., Inc., 103 F.3d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
15 JEDEC also makes an appearance in the Rambus disputes, discussed below. 
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began to manufacture chips conforming to the standard, Wang began to enforce its patent against 
them. Mitsubishi argued that Wang’s conduct over a six-year period gave rise to an implied license 
under the patent. A jury agreed with Mitsubishi, and both the district court and the Federal Circuit 
affirmed, pointing to the large amount of evidence that Wang’s conduct created an implied license.  
 
In Qualcomm I,16 the Federal Circuit held that Qualcomm’s intentional failure to disclose 
essential patents covering the H.264 video compression standard to the Joint Video Team (JVT) 
SDO supported the district court’s finding that Qualcomm ceded its right to enforce those patents 
under the doctrine of implied waiver.17 The district court applied the remedy of unenforceability 
to the patents that Qualcomm failed to disclose. It analogized Qualcomm’s inaction to inequitable 
conduct before the PTO and patent misuse -- other forms of conduct resulting in the 
unenforceability of the relevant patents.18 The Federal Circuit approved the district court’s 
reasoning, recognizing its authority to “give a fair, just, and equitable response reflective of the 
offending conduct.” 19   
 
In each of these cases, the remedy for the SEP holder’s failure to disclose patents in violation 
of an SDO’s written or unwritten policies was to render the undisclosed SEPs unenforceable 
against products implementing the relevant standards.  This remedy is sweeping, as it is generally 
interpreted to cover not only the particular product manufacturer that raised the defense, but all 
implementers of the relevant standard.20 
   
 
C. Antitrust Remedies for Standards Deception 
 
In addition to defenses that can be raised by the infringing implementer of a standard, standards 
deception by a SEP holder can give rise to antitrust claims under the Sherman Act. Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act makes it unlawful to “monopolize, or attempt to monopolize . . . any part of the 
trade or commerce among the several States.”21 To prevail on a claim for monopolization or 
attempted monopolization, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had power in the relevant 
market and willfully sought, acquired, or maintained that power in an unlawful manner. 
Monopolization claims also require that the defendant have “market power”, or the ability to distort 
competition in a particular product or technology market. Some have argued that standards, once 
adopted broadly in the marketplace, can confer market power on the holders of patents that are 
essential to the use of those standards.22 The abuse of such market power could thus constitute 
unlawful monopolization or attempted monopolization.  
 
16 Qualcomm Corp. v. Broadcom Inc., 548 F.3d 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2008) [Qualcomm I]. 
17 Id. at 1022. The Federal Circuit also spoke favorably about the doctrine of estoppel, though because of the 
court’s finding regarding waiver, did not need to reach the issue. Id. at 1024. 
18 Id. at 1025–26. 
19 Id. at 1026. 
20 See Jorge L. Contreras, Equity, Antitrust and the Reemergence of the Patent Unenforceability Remedy, 
ANTITRUST SOURCE (Oct. 2011) (discussing remedy of patent unenforceability and other equitable remedies). 
21 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
22 Daniel G. Swanson & William J. Baumol, Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory (RAND) Royalties, Standards 
Selection, and Control of Market Power, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 3-4 (2005); AM. BAR ASSN., HANDBOOK ON ANTITRUST 
ASPECTS OF STANDARD SETTING 115–17 (2d ed., 2011); Herbert Hovenkamp, FRAND and Antitrust, PENN LAW: 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3550523




The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has taken the view that a SEP holder’s failure to disclose 
patents essential to industry standards can thus constitute a violation of Section 2. As explained by 
the FTC, “Exclusionary conduct such as deception may distort the selection of technologies and 
evade protections designed by [SDOs] to constrain the exercise of monopoly power, with 
substantial and lasting harm to competition”.23 
 
The FTC has brought claims based on deceptive conduct within an SDO principally under its 
authority to enforce Section 5 of the FTC Act, which prohibits unfair methods of competition.24 
These cases have included actions against Dell Computer25 and Unocal26, both of which involved 
allegations that an SDO participant deceptively withheld information about patents essential to the 
practice of a standard, and later sought to assert those patents. In each case, this deception was 
claimed to constitute exclusionary conduct giving rise to a claim for monopolization. The FTC 
settled its cases against Dell and Unocal, in each instance entering a consent order effectively 
rendering the asserted patents unenforceable.27 
 
Perhaps the best-known case of alleged deception within a standards body involved 
semiconductor memory designer Rambus, Inc. The FTC investigated Rambus for a pattern of 
allegedly deceptive conduct within JEDEC, including the amendment of its undisclosed patent 
applications to cover current discussions within the SDO. The FTC found that Rambus had 
engaged in deceptive practices amounting to unfair methods of competition that violated Section 
5 of the FTC Act, as well as violations of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.28 
 
This theory also received support from the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Qualcomm 
II,29 a private antitrust action brought by Broadcom in response to Qualcomm’s assertion of 
previously undisclosed SEPs against it.30 Broadcom argued that Qualcomm’s intentionally false 
representations to an SDO known as the Joint Video Group (JVG) violated Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, and the court agreed. It noted that such deception “harms the competitive process 
by obscuring the costs of including proprietary technology in a standard and increasing the 
likelihood that patent rights will confer monopoly power on the patent holder.”31 Despite the 
specter of such liability, however, the court found that Broadcom lacked standing to bring a claim 
for monopolization (as it did not yet compete in the relevant market), and that it failed to allege a 
 
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 19–20 (Aug. 2019) 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3095&context=faculty_scholarship. 
23 In re. Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, 2006 WL 2330117, at *18 (F.T.C Aug. 2, 2006), rev’d, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 
2008). 
24 15 U.S.C. § 45. 
25 In re Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996). 
26 In re. Union Oil Co. of Cal., F.T.C. Docket No. 9305 (F.T.C. Jul. 27, 2005). 
27 See Lim, supra note 12, at 54-56; Hesse & Marshall, supra note 8, at 271–72. 
28 In re. Rambus, Inc., Docket No. 9302 (F.T.C. 2006). The FTC’s judgment against Rambus was reversed by the 
DC Circuit due to the FTC’s failure to prove an antitrust injury (harm to competition) (Rambus, Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 
456 (D.C. Cir. 2008). See, generally, Lim, supra note 12, at 51–54; Hesse & Marshall, supra note 8, at 272–73. 
29 Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2007) [Qualcomm II]. See also Hesse & Marshall, 
supra note 8, at 274–75. 
30 Qualcomm II, 501 F.3d at 314. Note that this action was brought roughly in parallel with the action that resulted 
in the Federal Circuit’s 2008 ruling in Qualcomm I, discussed above. 
31 Id. 
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cognizable antitrust injury.32 Thus, the court did not ultimately apply the Sherman Act to 




II. THE ENOXAPARIN CONTROVERSY: A BIOPHARMA STANDARDS DISPUTE 
 
A. Enoxaparin – Approval and Market Entry 
 
The anticoagulant properties of the heparin molecule were first described in 1916.33 It soon 
became a common antidote for thrombosis, myocardial infarction and other clotting disorders. In 
the 1970s, researchers began to experiment with shorter chemical chains derived from the heparin 
molecule – low molecular weight heparins – which appeared to offer similar efficacy with fewer 
side effects.34 The first such low molecular weight heparin to be approved for use in humans was 
enoxaparin. Sanofi-Aventis filed a U.S. patent application covering enoxaparin in 1991, resulting 
in the issuance of U.S. Pat. No. 5,389,618  in 1995.35  Shortly thereafter, Sanofi-Aventis introduced 
enoxaparin to the U.S. market under the brand name Lovenox.36 Lovenox became a blockbuster 
drug, achieving $2.7 billion in sales during 2009 alone.37 
 
In March 2003, Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, a specialty pharmaceutical manufacturer based 
in Rancho Cucamonga, California, filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) with the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), seeking clearance to market a generic or biosimilar 
version of enoxaparin.38 Amphastar’s ANDA contained a declaration challenging Sanofi-
Aventis’s ‘618 patent.39 As a result, in August, 2003, Sanofi-Aventis sued Amphastar for 
infringement of the ‘618 patent.40  That litigation continued for five years and was appealed twice 
to the Federal Circuit. In May 2008, the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision that the 
‘618 patent was unenforceable due to Sanofi-Aventis’s inequitable conduct before the PTO.41  The 
invalidation of Sanofi-Aventis’s ‘618 patent cleared the way for generic entry of competitors into 
the market for enoxaparin, pending FDA approval.   
 
 
32 Id.  
33 JIE JACK LI & E.J. COREY, DRUG DISCOVERY: PRACTICES, PROCESSES, AND PERSPECTIVES 189 (2013). 
34 Id. 
35 U.S. Pat. No. 5,389,618 (Feb. 14, 1995). The ‘618 patent was reissued on June 14, 2005 as U.S. Patent No. RE 
38,743. 
36 Complaint at 4, Amphastar Pharm., Inc. et. al. v. Momenta Pharm., Inc., No. 5:15-cv-01914 (C.D. Cal. filed 
Sep 17, 2015).  
37 Dana A. Elfin, Momenta Battle Over Amphastar Generic Continues, BLOOMBERG (Jun. 20, 2017). 
38 Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and Research, Application Number: ANDA 076684, Chemistry Reviews, 3 (July 25, 
2011).  
39 The ANDA process includes what is known as a “Paragraph IV” certification. This regulatory pathway allows 
a generic drug maker to declare that the patent(s) protecting a brand-name drug are invalid or otherwise unenforceable. 
The certification immediately forces the issue to litigation in federal court, without requiring the generic manufacturer 
to enter the market and risk being held liable for patent infringement. See 21 U.S.C. §355. 
40 Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Sanofi-Aventis also sued 
Teva Pharmaceuticals of Israel, which had also submitted an NDA for the marketing of generic enoxaparin. [cite] 
41 525 F.3d at 1349. 
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In 2003, the Sandoz division of Novartis entered into a collaboration agreement with Momenta 
Pharmaceuticals of Cambridge, Massachusetts relating to the development, manufacture and 
commercialization of a generic version of enoxaparin.42 Based on characterization work conducted 
by Momenta, Sandoz filed its own ANDA relating to enoxaparin in August, 2005.43  
 
Enoxaparin, a broken-down form of the polymer heparin, is a complex biologic pharmaceutical 
that is manufactured using an organic process rather than traditional chemistry. As a result, it is 
difficult to determine definitively whether a particular generic version of enoxaparin is truly 
“bioequivalent” to the FDA-approved Lovenox. During the pendency of the ANDAs for generic 
enoxaparin, Sanofi-Aventis contended that enoxaparin could be manufactured only using Sanofi-
Aventis’s proprietary manufacturing process, and that without it, a generic manufacturer could not 
guaranty that what it produced was biologically equivalent to enoxaparin.44 Researchers at 
Momenta, however, identified a unique chemical signature for enoxaparin. On this basis, Momenta 
contended that one could reliably determine whether a manufactured compound was enoxaparin. 
As such, Momenta and Sandoz claimed to overcome Sanofi-Aventis’s objection that manufacture 
of enoxaparin would not be possible without using Sanofi-Aventis’s proprietary manufacturing 
process. In 2003, Momenta filed a patent application claiming several methods of characterizing 
enoxaparin. The patent was issued in 2009, listing five inventors including Dr. Zachary Shriver, a 
senior director of research analytics at Momenta. 
 
In July 2010, the FDA approved the Sandoz-Momenta ANDA for generic enoxaparin.45 
Sandoz began sales of enoxaparin in the U.S. shortly thereafter.  
 
B. The USP and Method 207 
 
The United States Pharmacopeial Convention (USP) is a non-profit organization founded in 
1820. USP produces a substance and preparation monograph for each FDA-approved drug, 
including biologics such as enoxaparin.46 The FDA relies heavily on USP monographs in 
approving drugs for marketing, and the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act provides that 
approved drugs must meet the strength, quality and purity requirements set forth by the USP.47 
 
In 2006, at the urging of Sanofi-Aventis, USP began to develop a standard for testing the purity 
of enoxaparin during the manufacturing process.48 The standard was based on the presence of a 
 
42 Complaint at 6–7, Amphastar Pharm., Inc. et. al. v. Momenta Pharm., No. 5:15-cv-01914 (C.D. Cal. filed Sep 
17, 2015).  
43 Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and Research, Approval Package for: Application Number: ANDA 77-857, 4 (July 23, 
2010).  
44 See Transcript of Record: Dr. Kaundinya at 13039, 13041, Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 
No. 18-1740 (Fed. Cir. appeal docketed March 29, 2018); Larry Bell & Peter O. Safir, Citizens Petition 1–26, 24 (Feb. 
19. 2003).  
45 Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and Research, Approval Package for: Application Number: ANDA 77-857, 1 (July 23, 
2010).  
46 See U.S. Pharmacopial Convention, Legal Recognition – Standards Categories, 
https://www.usp.org/about/legal-recognition/standard-categories#biologics (last visited Feb. 13, 2020). 
47 21 U.S.C. § 351(b), § 321(j). 
48 Presumably, Sanofi-Aventis wished to ensure that any generic version of enoxaparin on the market was in fact 
equivalent to Lovenox. 
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particular “1,6 anhydro ring” (AR) structure in 15-25% of enoxaparin carbohydrate chains.49 
Sanofi-Aventis proposed to USP a method (which Sanofi-Aventis had allegedly sought to patent) 
for determining whether the AR structure was present using high performance liquid 
chromatography (HPLC).50 Sanofi-Aventis urged USP to adopt its method as an official standard 
for the manufacture of enoxaparin. This eventually became known as Method 207.51 
 
Momenta participated in the deliberations at USP and opposed making the use of Method 207 
mandatory for determining the presence of the AR structure. According to Momenta, it developed 
a superior method for testing for the AR structure using nuclear magnetic resonance.52 During a 
USP meeting in 2008, USP announced that Sanofi-Aventis had allowed its patent application 
covering its method of detecting the AR structure to lapse.53 As there were no other known patents 
or patent applications covering the proposed method, USP approved Method 207 in 2009.54  Yet 
while the USP monograph for enoxaparin, which became effective in December 2009, contained 
a requirement that at least 20% of manufactured enoxaparin contain the AR structure, it did not 
require that a particular method be used to make that determination. 
 
During its evaluation of Amphastar’s ANDA for generic enoxaparin, the FDA issued a Quality 
Deficiency letter in September 2009, requesting Amphastar to confirm that its manufactured 
enoxaparin would comply with the requirements of the USP monograph, including presence of the 
AR structure.55 In its response, Amphastar committed that it would ensure that its manufactured 
enoxaparin would comply with the USP monograph requirements, including the presence of the 
AR structure in the required amounts.56 However, neither FDA nor Amphastar discussed the 
specific method that would be used to detect the AR structure in Amphastar’s manufactured 
enoxaparin. The FDA approved Amphastar’s ANDA in September 2011, after which it began sales 
in the U.S.57 
 
Two days later, Momenta brought suit against Amphastar for infringement of the ‘886 patent 
in the Federal District Court for the District of Massachusetts.58 Specifically, Momenta alleged 
that Amphastar’s method of testing manufactured enoxaparin for the AR structure infringed the 
 
49 Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 17, Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., Fed. Cir. Case No. 18-
1740 (filed July 30, 2018) [hereinafter Momenta Appeal Brief]. 
50 Id. at 17–18. 
51 USP, <207> Test for 1,6-anhydro Derivative for Enoxaparin Sodium. 
52 Momenta Appeal Brief, supra note 49, at 18. 
53 U.S. Pharmacopeia, Heparin Ad Hoc Advisory Panel, Meeting #14, Nov. 14, 2008 – Meeting Minutes, Item 
2.b (“USP has had successful correspondence with the company that may have patents that may pertain to the test or 
related tests. The company has reported that it will allow the one patent that may cover the method to lapse. As such 
USP is not aware of any patent issues that may cover the test. The [Advisory Panel] may proceed with the use of the 
test as planned.”) 
54 Complaint at 12, Amphastar Pharm., Inc. et. al. v. Momenta Pharm., No. 5:15-cv-01914 (C.D. Cal. filed Sep 
17, 2015).  
55 FDA Off. Generic Drugs, Deficiency Letter for ANDA 76-684, Dated Sept. 4, 2009 (Deficiency A2). 
56 Amphastar, Quality Amendment for ANDA 76-684 – Enoxaparin Sodium Injection, Sept. 18, 2009 (response 
to Deficiency A2). 
57 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Drugs@FDA: FDA-Approved Drugs 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/daf/index.cfm?event=overview.process&ApplNo=076684 (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2020).  
58 Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d 184, 188 (D. Mass. 2011) 
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claims of the patent, which covered numerous testing methods.59 After a lengthy set of 
proceedings, including two separate appeals to the Federal Circuit,60 a jury found in 2017 that 
Amphastar infringed the claims of the ’886 patent, but that the claims were invalid due to lack of 
enablement and inadequate written description.61 The District Court affirmed the jury’s verdict. 
 
In addition, Amphastar raised the equitable defenses of waiver and estoppel, as to which the 
jury rendered an advisory verdict in favor of Amphastar.62 The District Court adopted the jury’s 
advisory verdict.63 The basis for Amphastar’s waiver and estoppel was Momenta’s failure to 
disclose the ‘886 patent, allegedly in violation of USP’s rules and policies.  In 2015, Amphastar 
brought an antitrust action against Momenta and Sandoz, alleging that they violated the Sherman 
Act and state antitrust laws as a result of the same failure.64 
 
C. The USP Policies 
 
USP has a number of written policies that are binding on individuals and firms participating in 
its standardization work.  First is a set of Rules and Procedures that govern the conduct of USP’s 
various expert bodies.65 Second is a written set of Guidelines governing the submission of 
proposals for the creation of a new USP monograph.66  
 
Amphastar argues that USP’s written policies required Dr. Shriver to disclose the existence of 
Momenta’s application for the ‘886 patent to USP prior to approval of the standard, which he did 
not.  Due to this failure, Amphastar alleged that Momenta intentionally violated USP’s policies.67  
 
59 There are numerous methods that can be used to test enoxaparin for the presence of the AR structure. As noted 
above, Sanofi-Aventis developed a method based on HPLC which eventually was adopted as USP’s Method 207. 
Momenta Appeal Brief, supra note 49, at 17–18. Momenta first used capillary electrophoresis, and then switched to a 
superior method based on nuclear magnetic resonance. Mom. Momenta Appeal Brief, supra note 49, at 18. And 
Amphastar developed a disaccharide building block (DBB) procedure for testing enoxaparin, which the FDA approved 
in 2006 and 2007. Stephen A. Campbell, Telephone Amendment: RE: ANDA 76-684, Enoxaparin Sodium Injection, 
AMPHASTAR PHARM., (Nov. 2, 2006). Stephen A. Campbell, Telephone Amendment: RE: ANDA 76-684, Enoxaparin 
Sodium Injection, AMPHASTAR PHARM., (March 29, 2007).  At some point after it began to produce generic enoxaparin 
in September 2011, Amphastar switched from the DBB procedure to Method 207 for testing its product. Momenta 
alleges that Amphastar strategically switched from the DBB procedure to Method 207 in order to argue that because 
it was using a method required by the FDA (a requirement that Momenta disputes), it was immunized from suit under 
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (“It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States 
… a patented invention … solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information under 
a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs…”). 
60 See Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Momenta Pharm., Inc. 
v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 457 F. App’x. 929 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
61 Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3d 258 (D. Mass. Feb. 7, 2018) (Momenta I). 
62 The applicability of equitable defenses is typically a question reserved to the court. However, courts may put 
such questions to a jury to render an advisory verdict, which the court may or may not adopt. J.E. Macy, Nature and 
Effect of Jury’s. Verdict in Equity, 15 A.L.R. 1147 (originally pub. 1945). 
63 Momenta I, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 265. 
64 Amphastar Pharm., Inc. v. Momenta Pharm., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 3d 222 (D. Mass. 2018) (Momenta II). 
65 USP, USP Rules and Procedures of the 2005-2010 Council of Experts (Effective Jan. 1, 2008) [hereinafter USP 
Rules and Procedures]. 
66 USP, USP Guideline for Submitting Requests for Revision to USP-NF V4 July 2009 [hereinafter USP 
Guidelines]. 
67 Complaint at 10–11, Amphastar Pharm., Inc. et. al. v. Momenta Pharm., No. 5:15-cv-01914 (C.D. Cal. filed 
Sep 17, 2015).  
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In consequence, Amphastar argued that (1) Momenta waived its right to enforce the ‘886 patent, 
(2) Momenta was estopped from enforcing the ‘886 patent, and (3) Momenta and Sandoz violated 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, as well as various state antitrust and competition statutes by 
“wrongfully acquiring monopoly power by deceiving the USP into adopting a standard which they 
later claimed was covered by” the ‘886 Patent.  These allegations reflect a typical SDO deception 
scenario, akin to the facts alleged in cases like Dell, Rambus and Broadcom v. Qualcomm. In each 
of these cases the central issue is “the consequence of silence in the face of a duty to disclose 
patents in a standards-setting organization”.68  
 
In assessing Momenta’s failure to disclose the ‘886 patent, the court considered Momenta’s 
and Dr. Shriver’s obligations under USP’s written policies.  First, Section 2.05 of the USP Rules 
and Procedures states that no advisory panel member with a “financial or other interest that may 
conflict, or may appear to conflict, with his or her duties and responsibilities with respect to a 
particular matter, shall vote on such matter.”69  Dr. Shriver was a member of USP’s Heparin Ad 
Hoc Advisory Panel, and as such was subject to the Rules and Procedures. Accordingly, Dr. 
Shriver abstained from voting on the Method 207 standard.70  
 
Second, Section 2.06(a) of the Rules and Procedures requires that each advisory panel member 
submit to USP a written statement disclosing his or her employer, sources of research funding, and 
“other professional or financial interests, including intellectual property rights, that may result in 
a conflict of interest or the appearance of a conflict of interest”.71 Dr. Shriver submitted such a 
statement and accurately identified Momenta as his employer.72 
 
Third, under the USP Guidelines, all “Sponsors” of USP technical proposals are requested to 
disclose “whether any portion of the methods or procedures submitted are subject to patent or other 
Sponsor-held intellectual property rights”.73  Momenta made no disclosure responsive to this 
provision.74 
 
Amphastar argued that these three provisions, individually and collectively, required 
Momenta, through Dr. Shriver, to disclose the existence of the ‘886 patent and its relevance to 
Method 207 while it was under consideration at USP. The court, however, disagreed.  First, Dr. 
Shriver’s abstention from the vote on Method 207 was in compliance with Section 2.05 of the 
Rules and Procedures.  
 
As for the Guidelines, Momenta was not formally a “Sponsor” of Method 207 (the only official 
Sponsor being Sanofi-Aventis), making the patent disclosure request inapplicable to Momenta.  
 
Finally, Dr. Shriver’s conflict of interest form correctly identified Momenta as his employer. 
At most, the catch-all provision requiring disclosure of “other professional or financial interests” 
 
68 Qualcomm I, 548 F.3d at 1008. 
69 USP Rules and Procedures, supra note 65, at § 2.05. 
70 Momenta I, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 266.  
71 USP Rules and Procedures, supra note 65, at § 2.06(a). 
72 Zachary Shriver, USP Council of Experts, Expert Committee, and Ad Hoc Advisory Panel Member Conflict 
of Interest Statement (Feb. 26, 2008) (reproduced in Momenta Appeal Brief, supra note 49, at 16). 
73 USP Guidelines, supra note 66, at 5. 
74 Momenta I, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 265.  
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was ambiguous in its requirements. Accordingly, the court found that, at worst, the USP policies 
were ambiguous regarding an affirmative obligation to disclose patents.75 
 
D. Participant Understanding of USP’s Disclosure Requirement 
 
In at least two well-known standards deception cases in the ICT industry, the court has looked 
beyond the ambiguous language of the relevant SDO’s policies to find an affirmative obligation 
to disclose SEPs. In Rambus v. Infineon,76 semiconductor designer Rambus, Inc. was accused, 
among other things, of committing fraud based on its alleged concealment of patents that were 
essential to the implementation of a standard developed at JEDEC. The district court found that no 
such duty of disclosure was created by JEDEC’s written policies. But the court also found, based 
on the testimony of various JEDEC participants, that even without a written disclosure 
requirement, SDO participants shared a common understanding that they should disclose patents 
necessary to practice JEDEC standards.77 As such, the court recognized a legal duty to disclose 
arising from the norms and practices of JEDEC participants.78  
 
The Federal Circuit in Qualcomm II also upheld a lower court’s recognition of a duty to 
disclose based on informal expectations and practices of SDO participants, where such a duty was 
not clearly delineated in the SDO’s written policies.79 The court in Qualcomm II recognized that 
“[a] duty to speak can arise from a group relationship in which the working policy of disclosure of 
related intellectual property rights (’IPR’) is treated by the group as a whole as imposing an 
obligation to disclose information in order to support and advance the purposes of the group.”80 
 
Accordingly, the district court in Momenta I considered whether  USP participants may have 
“understood the policies to include a duty to disclose” patents essential to USP standards, 
notwithstanding the ambiguity of USP’s written policies.81 In support of this proposition, 
Amphastar introduced testimony from at least one former USP employee, who testified that there 
was a “common understanding” among USP participants that patent disclosures were required.82 
This witness described a 2008 advisory panel meeting at which a USP employee observed that 
Sanofi-Aventis, the Sponsor of Method 207, had disclosed a relevant patent. According to the 
witness, a representative from Momenta then asked USP to request Sanofi-Aventis to abandon the 
patent before the standard was approved, which it ultimately did.83 Amphastar argued that all of 
these facts indicated both an informal expectation among USP participants to disclose patents 
covering USP standards, and that Momenta was aware of this expectation. The court agreed, 
finding that notwithstanding the absence of an express requirement to disclose patents essential to 
 
75 Id.  
76 Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
77. Id. at 1098.  
78. Notwithstanding the existence of such a duty, Rambus was found not to have violated its obligation to disclose 
patent applications to JEDEC. Id. at 1105. See also Broadcom I (finding similar duty to disclose patents based on 
informal norms and expectations of SDO participants). 
79 Broadcom I. 
80 Qualcomm I, 548 F.3d at 1022. 
81 Momenta I, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 265–70. 
82 Id. at 268.  
83 Id. at 267. 
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As noted in Part I, both courts and the FTC have found that a patent holder’s deceptive failure 
to disclose a SEP in violation of an SDO’s rules can result in a waiver of the right to enforce the 
SEP. Given that Momenta had an implicit duty to disclose patents essential to its standards, 
Amphastar argued that Momenta breached that duty by failing to disclose the ‘886 patent. As a 
result, Amphastar argued that Momenta should be deemed to have waived its right to enforce the 
‘886 patent against Amphastar and other implementers of Method 207. The district court agreed.   
 
Citing Hynix v. Rambus, the court explained that “implied waiver occurs if the behavior of the 
patent owner was so inconsistent with an intent to enforce its rights as to induce a reasonable belief 
that such right has been relinquished.”85 Finding that Momenta had a duty to disclose the ‘886 
patent to USP, and that it breached this duty, the court held that Momenta had waived its right to 
enforce the patent against implementers of Method 207.86 
 
F. Equitable Estoppel 
 
Amphastar also argued that it reasonably and detrimentally relied on Momenta’s misleading 
failure to disclose the ‘886 patent, which induced it to make significant investments in 
manufacturing enoxaparin using Method 207. As a result, Amphastar argued, Momenta should be 
estopped from enforcing the ‘886 patent against it with respect to the use of Method 207. The 
district court agreed. It noted that to succeed on a claim for equitable estoppel, the alleged infringer 
must prove that the patent owner engaged in misleading conduct that resulted in a reasonable 
inference that it did not intend to enforce its patent.87 The infringer must then show that it relied 
on the misleading conduct and that it will be materially prejudiced if the patent holder is permitted 
to enforce the patent against it.88 The court acknowledged that a patent holder’s breach of its 
obligation to disclose a patent to an SDO can constitute misleading conduct in this context, and 
that an infringer’s subsequent adoption of the relevant standard can demonstrate reliance.89 
 
Applying these principles to the facts alleged in this case, the jury found, and the district court 
affirmed, that Momenta breached its duty to USP through its silence, and that Amphastar 
detrimentally relied on the Momenta’s silence in practicing Method 207.90 Accordingly, it held 
 
84 Id. at 264. 
85 Momenta I, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 269 (citing Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1336, 1348 
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Qualcomm I, 548 F.3d at 1020)). 
86 Id. at 265. The court limited the unenforceability of the ‘886 patent to processes implementing USP Method 
207 only. Because only two of the processes used by Amphastar conformed to Method 207, and Amphastar’s DBB 
process did not, the ‘886 patent was held to be unenforceable as to the two procedures that conformed to the standard, 
but not to DBB.86 Id. at 270. 
87 Id. at 268. 
88 Id. at 269–70. 
89 Id. at 269. 
90 Id. at 269–70. 
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that Momenta was estopped from enforcing the ‘886 patent against Amphastar with respect to 
Method 207.91 
 
G. Antitrust Claims 
 
In addition to raising its waiver and estoppel defenses in the infringement suit brought against 
it by Momenta, in September 2015 Amphastar brought a separate action charging Momenta and 
Sandoz with violations of the Sherman Act and California antitrust and competition law.92 These 
claims were all based on Momenta’s alleged failure to disclose the ‘886 patent to USP in violation 
of USP’s policies.93 Amphastar argued that Momenta “wrongfully acquir[ed] monopoly power by 
deceiving the USP into adopting” Method 207. This conduct, Amphastar alleged, both improperly 
excluded Amphastar from the market for generic enoxaparin and drove up the price of generic 
enoxaparin by billions of dollars.94  
 
In denying Momenta’s motion to dismiss this claim, the court again cited Qualcomm II, in 
which the court explained that “[d]eception in a consensus-driven private standard-setting 
environment harms the competitive process by obscuring the costs of including proprietary 
technology in a standard and increasing the likelihood that patent rights will confer market power 
on the patent holder”.95  Because Amphastar alleged such conduct, the court held that Amphastar 
had articulated a cognizable claim for monopolization under the Sherman Act.96 
 
In addition, a month after the initiation of Amphastar’s antitrust suit, a group of plaintiffs led 
by Nashville General Hospital brought an antitrust class action suit against Momenta and Sandoz 
in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee.97 The plaintiffs, consisting of 
hospitals, HMOs and other healthcare payors, alleged that Momenta’s and Sandoz’s actions 
delayed Amphastar’s entry into the market for generic enoxaparin, resulting in elevated prices for 
the drug.  They alleged violations of both Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 
 
 
H. Appeal and Settlement 
 
Momenta and Sandoz appealed the district court’s decisions on waiver and estoppel to the 
Federal Circuit in July 2018.98  But in June 2019, prior to oral argument, the parties settled their 
dispute. Under the terms of a confidential settlement agreement, Momenta and Sandoz paid 
 
91 Id. at 270. 
92 Amphastar filed this suit in the Central District of California in September 2015. Amphastar Pharm., Inc. v. 
Momenta Pharm., Inc., 5:15-cv-01914 (D. C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 17, 2015).The case was transferred to the District of 
Massachusetts in January 2016.  Momenta II, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 227 
93 Complaint at 10–12, Amphastar Pharm., Inc. v. Momenta Pharm., Inc., 5:15-cv-01914 (D. C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 
17, 2015). 
94 Id. at 19.  
95 Amphastar Pharm., Inc. v. Momenta Pharm., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 3d 222, 230 (D. Mass. 2018). 
96 Id. at 230.  
97 See Complaint, Hosp. Auth. of Metro. Gov’t of Nashville v. Momenta Pharm, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 3d 705 (M.D. 
Tenn. 2017). 
98 Momenta Appeal Brief, supra note 49. 
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Amphastar $59.9 million and dismissed all pending litigation among the parties.99 The parties  
separately settled the Tennessee antitrust class action in December 2019, with Momenta agreeing 




III.  IMPLICATIONS OF MOMENTA V. AMPHASTAR – HOW WILL BIOPHARMA FARE IN THE STANDARDS 
WARS ? 
 
The district court decision in Momenta I was the first to apply the patent nondisclosure and 
deception principles established in ICT standardization cases to parties in the biopharmaceuticals 
sector. While there are notable similarities between the facts alleged in Momenta and those in 
earlier ICT cases like Wang, Stambler, Qualcomm and the series of cases in involving Rambus, 
there are significant differences as well.  Several of these differences were raised by Momenta in 
its briefing to the Federal Circuit, but because the parties settled their dispute prior to consideration 
of the case by the Federal Circuit, the degree to which these differences might have been persuasive 
to the court are unknown. Nevertheless, it is worth considering some of these distinctions and the 
degree to which the patent nondisclosure and deception principles that evolved in the ICT industry 
are apposite to standardization at USP and in the biopharma sector more broadly. 
 
A. Is USP an SDO? 
 
Momenta argued in its appellate brief that USP differs significantly from the ICT-based SDOs 
around which the principles of standards deception and nondisclosure were first developed.  
 
USP is an independent, scientific organization that sets formulary standards for 
drugs sold in the United States. It is not a “standard-setting” body like those 
previously addressed by this Court: USP is not a consortium of industry competitors 
setting technical requirements needed for different products to interoperate. Rather, 
USP produces monographs describing the attributes of drugs; the monographs may 
be incorporated into requirements set by the FDA. USP’s monographs are produced 
by staff scientists, with input from eminent scientists who volunteer on advisory 
panels and others, including drug companies.101 
 
In the above description, Momenta points out two principal areas in which USP is unlike ICT-




99 Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Announces Settlement in Litigation with 
Momenta and Sandoz (July 19, 2019) http://ir.amphastar.com/news-releases/news-release-details/amphastar-
pharmaceuticals-inc-announces-settlement-litigation. 




101 Momenta Appeal Brief, supra note 49, at 14.  See also id. at 4 (“unlike the standard-setting organization in 
Qualcomm, whose members were industry competitors, USP is an independent, scientific organization.”) 
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1. SDO Structural Issues 
 
It is true that the technical work of many ICT-based SDOs is performed largely by volunteer 
representatives of the SDO’s membership – usually companies interested in the standards under 
development -- and the SDO’s staff play a predominantly administrative and coordinating role.102 
However, this allocation of responsibility varies from SDO to SDO, and some SDOs in the ICT 
sector have professional staff numbering in the hundreds.103  
 
Moreover, in Unocal, the FTC brought an enforcement action against Unocal with respect to 
its failure to disclose relevant patents to the California Air Resources Board (CARB).104 CARB, a 
governmental agency, was involved in developing regulations and standards governing the 
composition of low-emissions gasoline. Unocal participated in CARB’s public rulemaking 
proceedings, making various proposals and representations, while at the same time withholding 
information about several patent applications that it had filed on gasoline technologies under 
consideration by CARB. The fact that CARB was not an industry association typical of the ICT 
sector did not appear to deter the FTC from condemning Unocal’s allegedly deceptive conduct. 
Rather, the FTC’s focus was on Unocal’s “anticompetitive and exclusionary acts and practices” 
which constituted “unfair methods of competition” in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act.105 
That conduct, the FTC alleged, caused substantial harm to competition and consumers.106 The 
organizational structure of CARB, on the other hand, seems to have had little relevance to the 
analysis of Unocal’s conduct.  
 
The same can be said for those cases involving SDOs in the ICT sector.  In each of Wang, 
Stambler, Dell, Qualcomm and Rambus, the nature of the SDO had little bearing on the alleged 
conduct of the patent holder, and was scarcely discussed. Rather, the emphasis of the courts and 
agencies adjudicating these cases, whether under equitable defenses to infringement or affirmative 
theories of antitrust liability, was on the unilateral conduct of the patent holder in the face of a 
commitment to disclose SEPs to the SDO.107  Accordingly, it does not seem that structural 
differences between USP and ICT-based SDOs should play much, if any, role in analyzing 
Momenta’s conduct with respect to non-disclosure of its patents. 
 
2. Nature of the Standards 
 
Momenta also points out that the standards developed by USP are “monographs describing the 
attributes of drugs”, rather than “technical requirements needed for different products to 
interoperate”.108 While this description is itself somewhat inaccurate, as USP’s Method 207 
 
102 See generally, JRC Report, supra note 11, at 91-92. 
103 Id. 
104 Decision and Order, In re. Union Oil Co. of Cal., F.T.C. Docket No. 9305 (F.T.C., Jul. 27, 2005). 
105 Complaint at 19–20, In re. Union Oil Co. of Cal., F.T.C. Docket No. 9305 (Mar. 4, 2003). 
106 Id. at 19. 
107 Of course, the character of ICT-based SDOs as associations of competitors is highly relevant in cases charging 
the SDO or its members with collusion or other concerted action.  See, e.g., George S. Cary & Daniel P. Culley, 
Concerted Action in Standard-Setting, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: 
COMPETITION, ANTITRUST AND PATENTS 61 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2018). But allegations of collusion at the SDO 
level played no part in Momenta. 
108 Momenta Appeal Brief, supra note 49, at 14. 
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described a method for testing the purity of a compound, rather than any particular attribute of the 
compound, Momenta is correct that USP’s standards differ from ICT-based standards that seek to 
enable product interoperability. Yet this distinction does not seem meaningful in the context of 
Momenta’s alleged failure to disclose its patent. If Momenta’s actions harmed competitors like 
Amphastar (by inducing them to use an infringing method when testing the purity of enoxaparin) 
or hospitals and healthcare payors (by reducing competition and thus raising the price of generic 
enoxaparin), then the fact that the standard related to a testing method rather than product 
interoperability is largely irrelevant. This conclusion is supported by the FTC’s reasoning in  
Unocal, in which the relevant CARB standard related to the chemical composition of reduced 
emission gasoline. The standard did not pertain to product interoperability, yet Unocal’s deceptive 
concealment of its patents nevertheless resulted in competitive and consumer harm.  Accordingly, 
the nature of USP’s standards does not seem particularly relevant to the analysis of Momenta’s 
conduct. 
 
B. Was Method 207 Mandatory? 
 
In its appellate briefing, Momenta also places great weight on its conclusion that Method 207 
was not “mandatory”. There is clearly some debate regarding whether Amphastar’s use of USP 
Method 207 was required by the FDA. According to the district court, “the jury apparently found 
credible the testimony of Amphastar’s witnesses … that Amphastar used the revised [AR testing] 
procedure in reliance on [Method 207] and was required by the FDA to do so.”109 Amphastar 
emphasizes this point in its appellate brief, arguing that “The FDA required Amphastar to use 
Method [207] and following the FDA’s requirements is not optional.”110 
 
Yet it is not clear from the record that this was actually the case.  As Momenta points out, the 
USP monograph on enoxaparin specified the required AR structure to identify the compound, but 
did not specify a particular testing methodology to detect this structure.  The FDA, in an amicus 
brief that it filed in an earlier phase of this case, explained that “to satisfy the [FDA] batch-testing 
requirement, a manufacturer has considerable latitude to employ any test protocol that meets the 
requirements specific to FDA’s approval of that drug, provided that the accuracy, sensitivity, 
specificity, and reproducibility of test methods employed by the firm are established and 
documented.”111 
 
USP’s Method 207 does describe a particular testing process for detecting the AR structure in 
manufactured enoxaparin, but this was not the only known testing process, and the testing process 
was not part of the USP enoxaparin monograph.  In fact, Momenta and Sandoz used a different 
testing process for their manufactured enoxaparin, and even Amphastar used a process that differed 
from Method 207 in some cases.112  Momenta argues that while the FDA required that Amphastar 
 
109 Momenta I, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 270. 
110 Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 55, Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., Fed. Cir. Case No. 
18–1740 (filed Sept. 21, 2018)  
111 Corrected Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA Inc., 
(Filed Jul. 17. 2015) (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 211.165(e)). 
112 Momenta Appeal Brief, supra note 49, at 53–54. 
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comply with the USP monograph on enoxaparin, and thus to test for the AR structure, the 
monograph did not specify how that testing was to be accomplished.113  
 
While the FDA was not explicit about the method for testing generic enoxaparin, there is some 
ambiguity regarding the degree to which USP requires the use of Method 207. Method 207 itself 
states that  
 
The following procedure is used to determine the levels of [AR structures] in 
enoxaparin sodium. [NOTE - The test … is conducted only where specified in the 
individual monograph.]”114   
 
This language implies that Method 207 is the way to test for the AR structure in enoxaparin 
(as testing is required by the enoxaparin monograph), not merely a way to test it. Moreover, 
Method 207 is included as part of USP’s National Formulary,115 and the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetics Act explicitly requires that the strength, quality and purity of approved drugs be tested 
“in accordance with the tests or methods of assay set forth in [the relevant] compendium” (in this 
case, the USP National Formulary).116 Thus, Amphastar’s argument that the use of Method 207 
was mandatory is not wholly without merit, even though it appears that Amphastar did not itself 
fully adhere to this requirement. 
 
But even if the use of Method 207 were not mandatory, it is not clear that this relieves Momenta 
of liability under relevant doctrines pertaining to patent disclosure in standard-setting. Admittedly, 
some technical standards that have been subject to disputes regarding patent disclosure are 
mandated by governmental edict. One example is the standard for low emissions gasoline adopted 
by CARB which was at issue in Unocal. However, in the ICT sector, most technical standards are 
voluntary.  That is, firms are not required, either by government regulation or SDO rules, to use 
them.117 The success or failure of interoperability standards is thus dictated largely by market 
forces rather than governmental edict, and the landscape is littered with abandoned standards that 
never achieved market success (e.g., who remembers WIMAX, Firewire or HD-DVD?). In fact, 
the voluntary nature of collaboratively developed standards is one of the principal safety 
mechanisms that ensure that SDOs do not exert anticompetitive market power by forcing 
participants to adopt their standards.118  
 
Nevertheless, Momenta attempts to recharacterize the voluntary nature of most ICT standards 
by reasoning that they are “effectively mandatory” – an industry participant must practice them in 
order to compete effectively.119 It argues that the threat of patent hold-up, and the accompanying 
anticompetitive effects, occur only when the adoption of a standard is mandatory (or “effectively” 
 
113 Id. at 53–54. 
114 Method 207, supra note 51, at 10. 
115 Id. 
116 21 U.S.C. § 351(b), § 321(j). 
117 See David J. Teece & Edward F. Sherry, Standards Setting and Antitrust, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1913, 1919-20 
(2003); ABA COMM. ON TECH. STANDARDIZATION, STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT PATENT POLICY MANUAL ix (Jorge 
L. Contreras ed., 2007) [hereinafter ABA Standards Manual]. 
118 See Raymond T. Nimmer, Technical Standards Setting Organizations & Competition: A Case For Deference 
To Markets, Washington Legal Foundation Critical Legal Issues Working Paper Series No.155, at 9-10 (2008). 
119 Momenta Appeal Brief, supra note 49, at 52. 
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mandatory).  But because Method 207 was not mandatory, it argues, Momenta could not hold the 
industry “hostage” as Qualcomm and others did in the ICT standards deception cases. Failing to 
disclose patents covering optional standards, Momenta argues, “creates no trap because industry 
participants can choose alternate technology.”120 
 
Momenta’s arguments here are worth considering in some detail, as they address the 
fundamental rationale behind liability for standards deception.  Clearly, when a technology is not 
standardized, a patent holder is free (subject to generally-applicable antitrust laws) to assert its 
patents covering that technology in any manner, whether to extract whatever royalties the market 
will bear, or to prevent others from competing with respect to patented features.  If a product 
manufacturer does not wish to pay the required royalty, or fears an injunction from the patent 
holder, then it is free to use an alternate, noninfringing technology. 
 
 When the patented technology is standardized, however, different considerations come into 
play. A standard is intended to be broadly adopted, and an SDO that imposes a patent disclosure 
policy does so in order to promote the broad adoption of its standards.  Market participants are 
encouraged to adopt such standards with the expectation that all SEPs have been disclosed. On 
that basis, they can make investments in manufacturing, design, marketing and the like, all based 
on the standardized technology, whether or not it is formally mandated by law or SDO rules. When 
a patent holder emerges later with a previously undisclosed SEP, these investments can be upset.  
 
In the case of enoxaparin, it appears that several methods of conducting AR structure testing 
were available, and several non-infringing alternatives were in use both by Momenta/Sandoz and 
Amphastar.  If it were truly the case that Amphastar was under no compulsion to use Method 207, 
then the only harm suffered by Amphastar from Momenta’s late disclosure of the ‘886 patent 
would have been its cost of switching to an alternate, noninfringing testing method. Nevertheless, 
those switching costs may have been non-negligible. In addition, in October 2011 Momenta 
obtained a preliminary injunction preventing Amphastar from selling generic enoxaparin on the 
basis of the ‘886 patent.121 Though the injunction was stayed by the Federal Circuit in January 
2012, four months later, Amphastar’s sales of generic enoxaparin were limited thereafter given the 
ongoing litigation.122 The class action plaintiffs claimed that Momenta and Sandoz were able to 
reap hundreds of millions of dollars in wrongful overcharges as a result of Momenta’s concealment 
of its patent.123 These considerations all point to some monetary remedy that may have been 
available to Momenta and the class action plaintiffs, which may have been borne out by the multi-
million dollar settlements that Momenta reached with each of them. 
 
However, the district court’s ruling in Momenta I did not award monetary relief to Amphastar, 
but rather rendered Momenta’s ‘886 patent unenforceable against the practice of Method 207 (i.e., 
Momenta’s waiver of its right to enforce the patent and its estoppel from doing so). And, 
presumably, this ruling would extend not only to Amphastar, but also to other producers of generic 
enoxaparin (e.g., Teva), and most likely stands even after the parties’ settlement of their various 
 
120 Id. at 53. 
121 Momenta I, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 263.  
122 See Amended Complaint at 21–22, Hosp. Auth. of Metro. Gov’t of Nashville v. Momenta Pharm, Inc., 244 F. 
Supp. 3d 705 (M.D. Tenn. 2017). 
123 Id. at 2.  
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suits.  As such, the unenforceability remedy can be seen as even more potent than monetary relief. 
And it is distinctly unrelated to the harm suffered by implementers of the relevant standard.  Rather, 
it addresses deceptive conduct by the patent holder in violating the SDO’s policies and is imposed 
to safeguard the integrity of the SDO standardization process, whether or not particular harm can 
be shown in a given instance. That is, even if Amphastar and the class action plaintiffs were unable 
to prove any monetary injury arising from Momenta’s concealment of the ‘886 patent, the 
unenforceability remedy would still be available to punish Momenta for its deceptive conduct.  
The next sections explore the contours of this liability. 
 
C. Intent to Trap the Industry 
 
Amphastar argues that even if it was required to disclose the ‘886 patent to USP and failed to 
do so, the district court should not have imposed the remedy of patent unenforceability because 
Momenta did not intend to “trap” the industry in a standard that it had patented.124 On the contrary, 
Momenta actively opposed the adoption of Method 207 at USP.  It argues that “Momenta sought 
to prevent USP from locking Momenta and anyone else into using Method 207 so that industry 
would be free to use newer, more accurate methods.”125 Momenta contrasts its behavior with that 
of Qualcomm in Qualcomm I, observing that “Qualcomm had engaged in a carefully orchestrated 
plan with the deadly determination of holding hostage the entire industry desiring to practice the 
… standard...”126 Momenta’s behavior, on the other hand, was “the very opposite of a patent holder 
intentionally trapping an industry into using its patent.”127 
 
Momenta’s argument are worth considering here. In most standards deception cases of which 
I am aware, the allegedly deceptive patent holder urged the SDO to adopt the standard, portions of 
which it had surreptitiously patented. If Momenta’s assertions are taken at face value, then its 
opposition to Method 207 would indeed suggest a less devious pattern of conduct than that 
challenged in cases such as Qualcomm I.128 
 
Nevertheless, Method 207 was ultimately adopted by USP as a standard, and Momenta did fail 
to disclose the ‘886 patent. If there is no penalty for such failures, then the effectiveness of SDO 
rules requiring disclosure would be severely limited.   
 
It is perhaps for this reason that the FTC, in its case against Dell Computer, adopted what could 
be termed a strict liability standard for failure to disclose SEPs to an SDO.129 In her dissenting 
statement, Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga outlines the relative blamelessness of Dell in dealing 
with the Video Electronics Standards Association ("VESA"): 
 
 
124 Momenta Appeal Brief, supra note 49, at 55–56. 
125 Id. at 56. As the attentive reader will note, this argument could be viewed as at odds with Momenta’s prior 
argument that Method 207 was not mandatory. 
126 Id. at 50 (quoting Qualcomm I, 548 F.3d at 1009-10) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
127 Id. 
128 Even Qualcomm disputed the characterization of its behavior, arguing that “[e]ven if a duty to disclose had 
been breached, this breach is best explained as negligence, oversight, or thoughtlessness, which does not create a 
waiver.” Qualcomm I, 548 F.3d at 1020. 
129 See In re. Dell Computer Corp., Dissenting Statement Of Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga, 121 F.T.C. 627, 
630 (1996). 
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Nothing in the limited information available to the Commission suggests that Dell 
had any greater role in the development and promulgation of the VESA VL-bus 
standard than that described in the minimal factual allegations in the complaint. For 
example, the complaint does not allege that Dell proposed or sponsored the 
standard, that Dell urged others to vote for the standard, that Dell employees 
participated in drafting the standard, that Dell employees were present, in person or 
online, during the committee drafting sessions, that Dell steered the VESA 
committee toward adopting a standard that incorporated Dell technology, or that 
Dell had any hand whatsoever in shaping the standard. 
 
The sole act for which Dell is charged with a violation of law is that Dell's voting 
representative, in voting to adopt the standard, signed a certification that to the best 
of his know ledge, the proposed standard did not infringe on any relevant 
intellectual property.130 
 
Nevertheless, the FTC held that because Dell, as an entity, must have been aware of its patent 
covering the VL-Bus standard, and because it did not disclose that patent to the SDO, it lost the 
ability to enforce that patent against others. “[W]here Dell failed to act in good faith to identify 
and disclose patent conflicts -- enforcement action is appropriate to prevent harm to competition 
and consumers.”131  
 
Momenta, for its part, appears to have had even greater awareness of its relevant SEP than the 
Dell engineer who certified that he was unaware of Dell’s pending patents covering the VL-bus 
standard. At least Dr. Shriver, who made representations to USP, was an inventor on the ‘886 
patent and could hardly claim to have been unaware of it. Accordingly, the district court’s holding 
that the ‘886 patent was unenforceable does not go even so far as the FTC did in Dell. 
 
Likewise, there is little basis for Momenta’s argument that only intentional scheming to trap 
the industry is required to warrant a remedy of patent unenforceability.  Without this remedy, the 





The district court in Momenta I adopted the jury’s advisory verdict finding that Momenta 
should be equitably estopped from enforcing the ‘886 patent against Amphastar.132 In analyzing 
this claim, the court first recited the three general elements required for equitable estoppel: 1) 
misleading conduct that resulted in a reasonable inference of non-enforcement, 2) reliance and 3) 
that the infringer will be materially prejudiced if the patent owner’s claim is allowed.133 A finding 
of misleading conduct on the part of Momenta is supported by the findings, discussed above, that 
Momenta failed to disclose the ‘886 patent as required by USP’s informal rules. Likewise, material 
 
130 Id. at 628.  
131 Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, 624 (1996).  The FTC declined to address the prospect of liability for 
truly “inadvertent” failures to disclose patent rights. Id. at 625. 
132 Momenta 1, 289 F. Supp. 3d  at 270. 
133 Id. at 269 (citing Radio Sys. Corp. v. Lalor, 709 F.3d 1124, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). 
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prejudice is not difficult to find based on Amphastar’s alleged investment in the performance of 
Method 207.134 
 
Proving reliance, however, was “a closer question that was vigorously disputed at trial.”135 
Ultimately, the district court deferred to the jury’s evaluation of witness credibility in making this 
determination.136 In its appeal brief, Momenta refuted Amphastar’s reliance arguments on several 
grounds. First, it noted that Amphastar could not have relied on any statement or action of 
Momenta, as the parties had no dealings until this litigation.137 Second, Momenta objected to the 
district court’s “substituting Amphastar’s supposed reliance on USP in place of any reliance on 
statements or conduct by Momenta”.138 Even if such reliance could estop Momenta from asserting 
its patent, Momenta argued that Amphastar had no relationship or communication with USP either. 
Finally, Momenta points out that Amphastar did not start using Method 207 until 2011, after 
Momenta had sued Amphastar for patent infringement. Accordingly, Amphastar could not have 
relied on Momenta’s alleged deception in deciding to use Method 207.139 
 
Clearly, the facts of Momenta are complex and the district court may have been justified in 
leaving this fraught factual determination to the jury. Yet the difficulty of proving reliance in 
equitable estoppel cases has raised doubts regarding the general effectiveness of this doctrine in 
the standards-setting context.140 To address the potential mismatch between equitable estoppel and 
the misfeasance that can arise from deception in the standards-development context, I have 
previously proposed that courts consider adopting a modified form of promissory estoppel in 
which the implementer of a standardized product need not prove actual reliance on any statement 
or action of the defaulting patent holder, but only that the patent holder participated in an industry-
wide standardization activity intended to produce a broadly adopted standard (what I have termed 
“market reliance”).141 An approach such as this would alleviate many of the evidentiary challenges 




134 Id. at 270. 
135 Id. at 269. 
136 Id. at 270.  
137 Momenta Appeal Brief, supra note 49, at 69. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 69–71. 
140 See Contreras, Market Reliance, supra note 9, at 521–22 (“equitable estoppel is not an ideal theoretical 
framework for the general enforcement of [standards-related patent commitments]”); George S. Cary et al., The Case 
for Antitrust Law to Police the Patent Holdup Problem in Standard Setting, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 913, 939 (2011) (both 
the reliance and material prejudice elements of equitable estoppel may be difficult to prove in the standards context); 
Robert P. Merges & Jeffrey M. Kuhn, An Estoppel Doctrine for Patented Standards, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 39 (2009) 
(“equitable estoppel has inherent limitations that preclude its effectiveness against snake-in-the-grass and bait-and-
switch tactics. The primary defects are its requirements of: (1) misrepresentation by the patentee to the infringer; (2) 
reasonable reliance on those promises by the infringer; and (3) material reliance”). But see Henry E. Smith, Property 
as Platform: Coordinating Standards for Technological Innovation, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1057, 1086 (2013) 
(describing equitable estoppel as a viable “anti-opportunism safety valve” for standard setting). 
141 Contreras, Market Reliance, supra note 9, at 542–43. 
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E. The Need for Clarity in Biopharma SDO Policies 
 
Perhaps the most unusual aspect of the Momenta cases is the uncertain foundation upon which 
the obligation to disclose patents at USP was built. The district court acknowledged that no 
disclosure obligation was created by the Guidelines (which applied only to Sponsors) and that 
Momenta’s Dr. Shriver complied with the conflict of interest abstention rule set out in USP’s Rules 
and Procedures.142 The only source of a disclosure obligation binding on Momenta arose from the 
conflict of interest form that Dr. Shriver submitted, which asked him to list “other professional or 
financial interests”.143 His failure to list the ‘886 patent in response to this question gave rise to the 
“ambiguity” identified by the court and to the subsequent introduction of evidence of the common 
understanding of participants regarding patent disclosure. 
 
The district court in Momenta followed the lead of the Federal Circuit in Rambus v. Infineon 
and Qualcomm I by looking to such common understandings when confronted with ambiguous 
policy language. In particular, the court focused on USP’s insistence that Sanofi-Aventis abandon 
its own patent covering purity testing for enoxaparin.144 That, together with other witness 
testimony, gave rise to the obligation that the court found for all other expert panel members to 
disclose patents held by their own companies.  
 
Such a disclosure obligation may, indeed, have existed at USP.  However, it was far from clear.  
Preferable would have been a written policy document that clearly described what patent 
disclosure obligations, if any, bound the members of USP expert panels. The FTC’s 1996 ruling 
against Dell and the Federal Circuit’s 2003 holding in Rambus v. Infineon served as wake-up calls 
to SDOs in the ICT sector. In particular, the Federal Circuit’s sharp critique of the JEDEC patent 
policy -- which the court characterized as suffering from “a staggering lack of defining details” 
that left SDO participants with only “vaguely defined expectations as to what they believe the 
policy requires”145 – motivated many SDOs to clarify their own policies in this regard.146 The 
result is that the patent policies of many SDOs in the ICT sector have increased in length and 
complexity, but also define the obligations of SDO participants with a reasonable degree of 
specificity. 
 
Unfortunately, the same degree of evolution has not occurred in the policies of SDOs that 
operate in the biopharma sector.147 USP’s Rules and Procedures, as they are described in Momenta, 
 
142 See Section II.C, supra. 
143 Shriver, supra note 72. 
144 Momenta I, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 267.  
145 Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  
146 See, e.g., Contreras – Literature Review, supra note 7, at 27; Jorge L. Contreras & Andrew Updegrove, A 
Practical Guide to Patent Policies of Standards Development Organizations, 67(6) STANDARDS ENGINEERING, Issue 
1, 1, 3 (Nov/Dec 2015). Shortly after the Infineon decision was released, the American Bar Association initiated a 
three-year long project to provide drafting guidance to the industry regarding the terms of SDO patent policies. ABA 
Standards Manual, supra note 117. 
147 I tried to warn the biopharmaceutical industry about the need to pay closer attention to standardization issues 
in 2008.  See Jorge L. Contreras, Correspondence: Legal Issues in the Development of Biological Research Standards, 
26 NATURE BIOTECH. 498, 499 (2008): 
 
To date, the biological sciences have been blissfully free of the standards litigation battles that have plagued 
the ICT industry. With the increasing adoption of standards by biological researchers, however, these issues 
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resemble the conflict of interest policies of scientific journals and conferences more than patent 
policies of technical standards bodies. In order to avoid the degree of uncertainty and dispute 
evidenced by the Momenta cases, USP and other SDOs in the biopharma sector should carefully 
review their existing patent policies and make any needed clarifications and amendments to ensure 
that these policies clearly and unambiguously define the obligations of their participants.148 The 
added clarity that such an exercise can produce will facilitate the standardization process, avoid 
unintentional breaches of policy, and, hopefully, thwart those who deliberately wish to abuse the 





Momenta v. Amphastar demonstrates that issues surrounding the acquisition and disclosure 
of patents claiming standardized technologies have more salience in the biopharma sector than 
commonly believed. While significant factual uncertainty continues to exist with regard to the 
intentions and obligations of the parties in Momenta, the lack of clarity inherent in USP’s policies 
echoes the ambiguities that plagued SDO policies in the ICT sector two decades ago. As such, 
standards organizations operating in the biopharma sector should ensure that their policies and 
procedures are robust enough to delineate clearly the obligations of participants with respect to 
patents covering standardized technologies, and organizations that participate in biopharma 
standards-development should heed the valuable lessons offered by more than three decades of 
litigation in the technology sector. 
 
 
will become increasingly relevant. Thus, participants in the biological research field should take care to 
organize their standards-development efforts carefully and with adequate legal consideration. 
 
148 Such a process is currently under way, for example, at the Global Alliance for Genomics and Health (GA4GH), 
a group that develops standards for genomic data exchange and storage.  See Global Alliance for Genomics & Health, 
Constitution of the Global Alliance for Genomics and Health, § 7 (v2, Jan. 22, 2018) (“It is a guiding principle of the 
GA4GH that work products developed as part of the GA4GH Steering Committee and Work Stream processes will 
be openly shared for the benefit of humanity. Appropriate intellectual property policies will be developed and 
promulgated.”) 
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